**When fear turns into love:**

**A partial explanation of political trust in China**

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**Introduction**

Surveys have consistently revealed an extraordinarily high level of political trust in China, particularly towards central political institutions (ABS, 2002, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2019; CSS 2006, 2017, 2019, 2021; CGSS, 2010). While very few scholars question the validity of these results, many debate how to interpret them. A key issue in this debate is whether, and to what extent, respondents' political fear influences these numbers. Some argue that fear has significantly inflated political trust in China, while others dismiss its importance. However, both sides share one assumption: when respondents are fearful, their expressed political trust cannot be genuine. In other words, fear and trust are contradictory.

In this paper, we argue otherwise. In political reality, people can genuinely love what they fear and fear what they love. As evidenced by numerous biographies and memoirs from revolutionary years, many, if not most, people under Mao feared the CCP and Mao but at the same time sincerely loved them. Similar sentiments were held by Soviet citizens under Stalin and, probably to a lesser degree, by those under Putin and Kim Jong-un today. Authoritarianism and totalitarianism not only induce fear, but also often inspire love under specific conditions. In this paper, we argue that fear is not only compatible with genuine political trust in contemporary China; it has, in fact, significantly driven such trust.

To support our argument, we draw from cognitive dissonance theory in social psychology. First elaborated by Festinger (Festinger, 1957), cognitive dissonance theory has shown through hundreds of studies that not only beliefs shape behaviors, induced behaviors can also shape beliefs. People often internalize their actions that are influenced by rewards or punishments to reduce cognitive dissonance. Surprisingly, the extensive discussions on political trust in China have not borrowed this well-established theory in social psychology, which, in our opinion, could provide valuable insight into the "fear-trust" controversy.

Our argument posits that despite the adoption of a market economy and relaxation of social control, the Chinese state remains very strong, and has even grown stronger in the recent decade since Xi took power. Its capacity for distributing significant rewards and punishments effectively induces behavioral conformity, which in turn increases the psychological pressure to internalize behaviors with self persuasion. This is how fear (of missing rewards or facing punishments) becomes a driving force behind political trust.

We test the fear-trust dynamics in contemporary China through a series of public opinion surveys surrounding one watershed event in contemporary Chinese politics: the anti-corruption campaign launched after Xi's rise to power. We take the campaign as a "natural experiment" to observe how the rising threat of punishment among the "regime insiders" changes their level of political trust, and analyze whether the trust dynamics among them are different from those among the "regime outsiders," who are presumably much less threatened by the campaign. To observe the possible differences, we employ a Difference-in-Differences model, taking the anti-corruption campaign as the policy shock (the treatment), using the CCP membership and state-sector job to identify "regime insiders" (the treated group), and examine whether rising fear increases political trust among the treated group. To maximize the comparability of the treated and the control group, we employ Nearest Neighbor Matching (?) method to mitigate concerns of nonrandomness in the treatment group.

The findings lend support to our hypothesis that "more fear leads to more trust." We certainly do not argue that political fear all turns into regime support or that regime support is all derived from political fear in contemporary China or anywhere else. As argued by many cognitive dissonance scholars, dissonance aroused by cognition-behavior conflict would not trigger a self-persuasion process without certain conditions, among which two seem particularly important. First is the relative low cost of opinion change as compared to that of changing behaviors. Second is a level of (perceived) free choice: people would not start internalizing an action unless they are at least partially voluntary in taking it. In section two, we will elaborate these conditions and why they exist in contemporary China.

A natural challenge might arise: the regime insiders are more fearful, so they have faked more. We test this “faking hypothesis” through two widely used cross-examination methods. First, we compare the nonresponse rate of the treated group and that of the control group, checking whether the former has risen faster than the latter after treatment. Second, we compare the treated group's nonresponse rate on sensitive questions to that on less sensitive questions, checking whether the two evolve in a parallel way. None of the tests indicate that the regime insiders have "faked" more in post-treatment time. In other words, fear has likely led to genuinely more political trust through the stronger dynamics of self-persuasion.

The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. The first section will provide a brief literature review. In the second section, we will elaborate on our theory. The third section will explain our research design and hypothesis, and then lay out our variables, data and analytical models. The fourth part will report the regression results and address alternative explanations. We will then conclude with brief remarks in the last section.

**Literature Review**

The suspicion of political sensitivity bias in opinion surveys from China began as early as large-scale political surveys themselves. Shi, a pioneer of survey-based political culture studies in China, first raised the issue. To examine whether fear explains the extraordinarily high level of political trust in China, he used various tests, such as comparing the nonresponse rate between better-educated and less-educated respondents, as well as between more politically interested and less interested respondents, finding no evidence for "the fear hypothesis" (Shi, 2008. “East Asians”).

Since then, his argument has been supported by many studies adopting various methods. Lei and Lu (2017, Wariness) found, through two experimental surveys, that respondents assigned to an "officially affiliated survey" showed no higher nonresponse rate or more "politically correct answers" than those assigned to "normal" surveys when probed on questions related to political trust. In fact, those in the "officially affiliated survey" demonstrated more critical responses, indicating that political fear plays a negligible role in explaining high political trust in China. Stockmann, Esarey, and Zhang (2018, Afraid) also conducted an experimental study in Beijing to examine the question. They found that participants demonstrated more positive feelings towards TV advertisements briefly displaying the name of a central party institution than those without, which, according to them, is an indication of "affect transfer," thus rejecting the "fear" explanation of political trust.

Han and Truex (2020, Word Association Test) used an innovative method, Word Association Tests, to examine political attitudes in China. Their findings revealed that mainland respondents associate "almost exclusively positive response words" with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), suggesting that the high approval rate of the regime detected from surveys is not the result of preference falsification, but rather genuine sentiments of the respondents.

This line of argument has been challenged from the other side. By comparing Shanghai citizens' regime support before and after a major local purge, Jiang and Yang (2016, Lying) demonstrated a significant "purge effect": respondents expressed much more overt regime support after the purge, while the "actual" endorsement decreased. They interpret this difference as evidence of preference falsification due to political fear.

Some found mild “trust inflation” dirven by fear. Tang conducted a list experiment to identify the extent of political sensitivity bias in expressed political trust in China, finding a modest level of bias (Tang, 2016). Munro (2018, Refusal) argued that, after correcting for the "refusal bias" based on the refusers' response propensity, political trust in central institutions in China drops by up to 5 percent, and sensitivity bias might explain the overestimation. Ratigan and Rabin (2020, Nonresponse) reached a similar conclusion but found a larger effect (4-31 percent). They argue that nonresponse tends to come from marginalized groups, who have a more skeptical view of government leaders. Shen and Truex (2021, Self-censorship) demonstrated that self-censorship, measured by item nonresponse rate on politically sensitive questions versus nonsensitive questions, is not prevalent in most competitive authoritarian states. However, for non-competitive authoritarian regimes such as China, it is quite common, particularly among marginalized groups.

Li (2022, Decoding) approached the issue from an interpretive perspective, arguing that observed trust in the central government in China is considerably inflated because it reflects people's trust in the Center's commitment to good governance, not necessarily its capacity in monitoring and disciplining local officials. When taking this "discount" into consideration, that is, by measuring the gap between trust in commitment and trust in capacity, the actual level of political trust in the Center is much lower.

These different, often contrasting, findings on the issue are puzzling. The puzzle, however, becomes much less a puzzle if we recognize that political fear and trust are not necessarily contradictory. Both sides can be partially right, but in different ways: the sincerity detected by one side and the fear detected by the other side are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they could be mutually reinforcing under certain conditions. This is what we aim to argue in the rest of the paper.

**Theory**

Our theoretical framework is built upon the cognitive dissonance theory in social psychology. Before explaining why this theory is illuminating for the question we study, it is necessary to briefly review the theory itself. The cognitive dissonance theory, first developed by Festinger (1957), holds that when people face contradictory cognitions, the dissonance they feel will arouse an urge to restore cognitive consistency. To achieve such consistency, they sometimes change behaviors dissonant from an existing belief, but at other times change the belief itself when changing behaviors proves too difficult or costly. For example, a smoker may feel cognitive dissonance knowing that smoking is bad for their health. To reduce dissonance, they might either quit smoking, or, when it is too hard, develop the belief that "smoking is not that bad anyway" or "its benefits outweigh its harm for me." Different exits from cognitive dissonance mean that not only can beliefs change behaviors, but also behaviors can, in a reversed way, change beliefs. It is the latter that is particularly intriguing and provocative, generating numerous studies over decades. This basic framework, despite many revisions, still stands strong, gathering new evidence from animal experiments and neuroscience (Lydall et al., 2010; Van Veen/Krug, 2009 见文末Bib).

This seemingly simple theory has given rise to many research paradigms, one of which is called the "induced compliance paradigm." In the initial experiment of this paradigm (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959), a group of college students were offered some money to lie about something (presenting a boring task as interesting). Since the act of lying aroused cognitive dissonance, attitude change (toward believing the task was genuinely interesting) followed as a consequence.[[1]](#footnote-0) Many studies in later years have replicated similar results, suggesting that behaviors induced by rewards or punishments can lead to genuine attitude change because internalizing behaviors can reduce cognitive dissonance. Some scholars later argue that what attitude change intends to restore is not necessarily cognitive consistency, but self image or self affirmation (Steele, “the psychology of self-affirmation,” 1988), which we find a reasonable supplement, but not necessarily a refutation, of the earlier version of the theory .[[2]](#footnote-1)

However, not all behaviors lead to attitude change. Besides the comparative cost of attitude change (toward compliant behaviors) vs. adopting defiant behaviors, dissonance scholars emphasize the key role of free choice in triggering self persuasion (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Joule, 1998). That is to say, people do not feel the urge to intrinsically defend coerced behaviors. The self-persuasion process begins only when individuals feel personally responsible for their actions to a certain degree. For example, the Jews in the concentration camps would not persuade themselves to love Nazism because they were forced to be there, but the Nazi guards in the camps would likely strengthen their belief in Nazism because they chose to be there.

Another related research paradigm, the effort justification paradigm, also examines the effects of behaviors on attitudes, but focuses more on the lock-in effect of earlier and smaller efforts. In one experiment, researchers found that a group expending more effort to join a club developed a stronger liking for the club compared to the control group (Aronson and Mills, 1959). Again, the experiment's results were replicated in various settings (Freedman and Fraser, “Compliance without pressure,” 1966; Staw, 1981; Axsom & Cooper, 1985). For this "foot-in-the-door" effect, there is a Chinese proverb: "it is hard to get off the tiger when you are already on its back." The effort justification paradigm is an extension of the induced compliance paradigm, with the former explaining the initiation of self-persuasion and the latter the intensification of it.

Why is this theory relevant for the study of political trust in contemporary China? Summarizing the cognitive theories above, we find two conditions crucial in triggering the self-persuasion process. First is the presence of a tilted incentive structure that rewards compliance or punishes defiance, thus inducing compliance. Second is the exercise of free choice by the participants in adopting compliant behavoirs, which propels attitude change to restore cognitive consistenc or self-image. Both conditions, in our opinion, are solidly present in contemporary China.

First, a tilted incentive structure making noncompliance very costly certainly exists in contemporary China. Authoritarianism, by definition, means the state's extraordinary power in distributing rewards and punishments. However, authoritarianism has different levels, resulting in different degrees of “slope” of the incentive structure. It is unsurprising that, looking back at history, totalitarianism often inspires more love than "regular" authoritarianism. Under "regular" authoritarianism, the state's monopoly on power and resources is limited, so political compliance it generates tends to be limited as well, which in turn drives relatively little value change. Under totalitarianism, however, the state is the only "supplier" of significant rewards and punishments, and political activism is attached to success in almost every sphere. The more efforts individuals spend in "practicing" political loyalty, the more they have to internalize.

Contemporary China is certainly not a totalitarian state in the Maoist sense anymore. The market economy has long replaced the planned economy, and most people can live a relatively non-political life, which is probably why political fervor of the Maoist years has largely dissipated. However, a strong control of power and resources by the party-state still exists. The level of control is relatively low compared to the past, but still very high compared to most other countries. Such control refers not only to the vast state sector in China,[[3]](#footnote-2) but also to the "hanging sword" the state holds over the market economy and civil society. The boundary between the state, society, and market is capriciously fluid, and the security of property rights is guaranteed only to the extent that it does not pose a threat to state policies, let alone regime security. To give one example, through one policy change in 2021, the government banned the whole after-schoool tutoring industry, wiping out millions of jobs and plunging stock price of many private companies overnight, without causing a trace of collective opposition. With the party-state possessing such dominant power, it is understandable that people find political compliance much less costly than noncompliance.

The tilted incentive structure has tilted further after Xi came to power. Very few would deny that the party-state has intensified its control over economy and society since the mid-2010s. On the economic front, a tide of "state sector advancing and private sector retreating" has been rising. Despite demonstrating only a third of the productivity of private firms, state investment has grown much faster than private investment since 2012, with the growth rate of the former at 10 percent in 2022 and the latter only at 0.9 percent.[[4]](#footnote-3) On the social side, equipping the "grid management" system with high-tech monitoring capabilities, such as facial recognition and phone trackers, has “added wings to the tiger,” to borrow a Chinese proverb. One indicator of such extraordinary social monitoring capacity is the execution of zero-COVID policies for three years: from 2020 to 2022, the state was able to track billions of people's whereabouts and effectively restrict movement of any "COVID suspects." To put it in the CCP's own proud words, the centralization of power has reached the level that “being the party, the government, the military, the acedemic or the society, being the East, the South, the West, the North or the Middle, the CCP leads it all.”[[5]](#footnote-4)

Second, a level of volition in political compliance does exist in contemporary China. While open political opposition is strictly forbidden, the level of political activism is often subjective to personal choice. It is in this sense that free choice does exist in today’s China (or in Mao’s China). Undoubtedly, authoritarianism by default means a limitation of free choice. However, while people have no freedom in publicly opposing the regime and little freedom in criticizing its policies, they do have freedom in choosing how much to participate. In today's China, people can choose to join the CCP or not; they can choose to work in the state sector or not. Inside the regime, an individual can decide how actively he/she works for promotion or recognition. Outside the regime, a director can choose making a “patriotic movie” or not; a social media blogger can choose to whip up nationalism or not; a businessman can choose to apply for a government subsidy or not. Those who participate more actively would likely develop a stronger drive for self-persuasion according to the cognitive dissonance theory.[[6]](#footnote-5)

Voluntary regime participation is pervasive in China. One statistic reveals a lot: as of the end of 2020, the CCP has a membership of 95 million, with nearly 20 million joining after 2012.[[7]](#footnote-6) While some might be driven by values to join the CCP, many, if not most, are induced by the rewards and punishments the CCP can distribute. The size of the state sector is another indicator of the scale of willing joiners. According to one study (Ang, “Autocracy with Chinese characteristics,” 2018), the Party and state organs alone employ over 50 million people.[[8]](#footnote-7)

Political participation has also intensified in the past decade. As a response to rising uncertainties the private sector faces, the state sector has gained popularity among job seekers. It is reported that the applicants for national civil service has risen from 1.4 million in 2015 to 2.5 million in 2023.[[9]](#footnote-8) The proportion of college-educated CCP members has risen from 40 percent in 2012 to 53.2 percent in 2022, suggesting that the CCP has become more selective.[[10]](#footnote-9) As a small but symoblic footnote to such active political compliance, Chinese bureaucrats has started imitating Xi’s dressing code since the late 2010s, making his distinctive style of jacket a fashion among civil servants.[[11]](#footnote-10) Again, nobody coercively imposes the “Xi jacket” on anyone; it is the bureaucrats’ voluntary choice. The existence and intensification of pervasive regime participation means the second condition for self persuasion is also met.

Adding together, it seems reasonable to apply the cognitive dissonance theory to analyzing dynamics of regime support in contemporary China. Our general argument is therefore that the extraordinarily strong state in China has successfully induced, but not coerced, pervasive political compliance through an increasingly tilting incentive structure, and regime participation (the voluntary part of it, to be precise) has triggers a process of self perusasion to align beliefs with induced behaviors. This is how “fear” achieves a level of convertibility with “love” in contemporary China. We do not claim this mechanism accounts for the entire story of regime support in China, but it helps reconcile the fear-trust paradox to a significant degree.

**Research design, variables and data**

We take the anti-corruption campaign, launched after Xi's rise to power, as a "natural experiment" to test our theory that fear can lead to increased political trust. As widely known, Xi launched an extensive anti-corruption campaign after assuming power, which has become the "longest, widest-ranging and most penetrative anti-corruption campaign in the post Mao-era.”[[12]](#footnote-11) The scale of the campaign is remarkable: from 2012 to 2022, more than 4.6 million cases were investigated, with nearly all cases resulting in punishments of varying degrees.[[13]](#footnote-12) Among the investigated, 207,000 involved "local heads" (*yibashou*). No level of cadres has been exempt from the campaign. "Both tigers and flies should be cracked down on," as stated in the Party language. Among the members and alternate members of the 18th and 19th Central Committee, the highest governing body of the CCP, 61 members (about 8.4 percent) were taken down.[[14]](#footnote-13) With the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection (CCDI) standing above the judicial system, the severity of the treatment is also well documented.[[15]](#footnote-14) The campaign shows no signs of dwindling either. As shown in Figure 1, in 2020 there were 618,000 investigations, followed by 631,000 in 2021, and 592,000 in 2022, with the numbers remaining close to their peak.

It is crucial not to assume that the anti-corruption campaign focuses solely on corruption. Addressing potential rivals, eliminating factionalism, combating ideological disloyalty, and penalizing policy implementation slack are all integral components of the campaign. As Carothers states, the anti-corruption campaign has evolved into an "all-purpose tool," which is increasingly utilized to ensure unity and efficiency across political and policy domains (Carothers, all-purpose, 2021). The campaign's implementation is also selective based on factional loyalty, as many scholars have argued (Shih, “Protective Umbrella,” 2018; Pei, 2018). The broadness and arbritariness of the campaign are precisely what render potential targets fearful.

**Figure 1: Trend of corruption investigation case numbers (2006-2022)**



Source: Annual work reports of the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection of the CCP. (2006-2022)[[16]](#footnote-15)

It is reasonable to assume that the campaign has instilled greater fear among "regime insiders" than "regime outsiders," since the primary target of the campaign are the regime insiders. Such fear has likely in turn generated more efforts in political compliance: they need not only be more self-disciplined on matters of finance (the primary area of the anti-corruption campaign), but also stay closer in line with the party ideology, and be more diligent and proactive in their daily work in order to gain more credits for their safety in this whimsical storm. In essence, the "amount" of compliance has significantly increased. It is worth mentioning that the increasing efforts are not necessarily in exchange for greater rewards, but oftentimes simply for less risks of punishments.[[17]](#footnote-16)

Since our theory posits that more political fear leads to more political trust under the above-mentioned conditions, our hypothesis is thus that, following the launch of the anti-corruption campaign, which poses severe threat to the regime insiders thereby inducing more compliance, political trust among them, who choose to be inside the regime and stay there, will likely experience a larger increase compared to regime outsiders. To test this hypothesis, we employ a Difference in Difference model, taking the anti-corruption campaign as the treatment time and the regime insiders as the treated group, to observe whether such divergence has occurred.

It is important to note that we do not consider 2012, the year Xi assumed power, as the treatment year because it took time for the campaign to reach its full intensity, and for the targeted individuals to grasp its severity as similar campaigns had occurred under previous leaderships but brought down very few.[[18]](#footnote-17) As illustrated in Figure 1, the magnitude of the campaign did not become particularly "abnormal" until around 2015. Therefore, we choose 2015 as the dividing line.

In our main models, we use the CCP membership and state-sector job to identify "regime insiders," that is, the treated group. To be specific, when a respondent is both a CCP member and works in state sector, they are put into the treated group.[[19]](#footnote-18) The CCP membership is a straightforward dummy variable, requiring little explanation. The distinction of state-sector jobs from non-state sector ones is done through grouping answers to a particular question across the surveys: What is the nature of your current (or pre-retirement) workunit?[[20]](#footnote-19) The answers typically have around 10 categories, ranging from "the CCP and government organs" to "self-employed individuals" (see oneline Appendix A). [[21]](#footnote-20) We group all CCP and government organs, state-owned/state-controlled/collective enterprises, and government-affiliated institutions (*shiye danwei*) as the state sector (coded as 1), and other categories, as well as peasants, unemployed and retired individuals, as the non-state sector (coded as 0). The only exception is that we exclude pure physical labor in the state sector, such as cleaners working in the governmental buildings, construction workers in a state-owned enterprise or cooks in a public university, from the treated group.[[22]](#footnote-21) This is because our primary interest is in understanding how fear affects political trust, and there is no reason to believe that the anti-corruption campaign credibly threatens such physical labor no matter how we interprete the campaign. We provide further details on our job coding rules in online Appendix A.

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Our main dependent variable (DV) is trust in the central government. The survey question is staightforward: How much do you trust the following institutions? The central government is one of the institutions listed. The answers are ordinal categories, ranging from “completely trust” to “completely distrust.” We dichotomize the answers as a dummy. However, instead of grouping all positive categories into 1 and all negative ones into 0, we code “completely trust” as 1 and the rest as 0. The reason of this coding strategy is to capture variation of the DV as much as possible. Due to fear or love (or the fluidity of the two as argued by this paper), the Chinese respondents rarely choose negative answers to the trust question regarding the central government. Instead, the fluctuation of trust in the central government tends to be more subtly reflected in the changing proportion that chooses the highest category (“completely trust”). Figure 2 depicts mean value of the DV in two dummy formulas, with panel 1 adopting the positive-negative dichotomy, and the second the highest vs. the rest dichotomy. As seen from the figure, the second panel captures much more variation than the first, suggesting that using the positive vs. negative dummy will likely lead to a great loss of information. In addition, due to the fact that very few take the negative answers, the positive vs. negative cut will also result in a serious imablance of case numbers, to the extent that the credibility of regression might be questioned.[[23]](#footnote-22) Therefore, we construct our trust dummy using the highest vs. the rest formula. With that being said, we will still use the positive vs. negative dummy in one of the robust checks.

Figure 2. Fluctuation of political trust reflected in dummies of two formulas

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| panel ‑1 | panel ‑2 |

Our control variables include age, gender, education, marital status, ethnicity, and household registration status that distinguishes rural residents from urban ones. Unfortunately, due to a large scale of missing data, we are unable to identify a reliable variable on financial condition of the respondents (any followup on income CV?).

Ideally we would rely on one set of surveys to conduct our analysis, for example, the China Barometer Survey (CBS) or the Chinese Social Survey (CSS). Unfortunately, none of the surveys contain both our IV and DV in a way reasonably covering the entire period we are interested. For example, all 5 waves of the ABS have the political trust question we need, but wave 2 (2008) and wave 3 (2011) do not have the “nature of job” question, thus we are unable to identify “regime insiders” for these two rounds. The CSS surveys, on the other hand, all have the “nature of job” question, but only 2006, 2017, 2019 and 2021 have the political trust question, making the pre-treatment trend observation impossible. Another widely used survey, Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), also has only one round (2010) containing the political trust question. We are therefore forced to employ a combination of the following surveys to carry out our analysis: CBS2002, CSS2006, CGSS2010, CBS2014, CCS2017, CSS2019, CSS2021. Fortunately, both the IV and the DV questions across the three surveys are phrased in a highly similar way (See Appendix B for details), thus justifying our approach of survey combination. We will also run a robust check on only one survey source (the CSS), as we will explain soon, to ensure our results are not driven by the serendipity of survey combination,

To sum up, our main model is therefore…解释公式。。。

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We will conduct various robust checks to test the reliability of our findings (是否需要都做，请毓淞决定). First is to replace our DV with political trust in different formulas. To be specific, we will first use the positive vs. negative dummy to replace the highest vs. the rest dummy, as explained earlier, to see if a much more inert DV produces different results. We will then use a continuous DV, constructed by standardizing the ordinal categories of trust into a 0-1 scale, to observe whether the results change.

The second approach of robust tries a different IV. Instead of using the “party membership plus state sector job” to detect political fear, we believe “party membership plus higher education” is also a good measurement of political fear after the mid-2010s. Why higher education? This is because the better educated, while not necessarily threatened by the anti-corruption campaigns, are at increasing risk of the ideological “sword showing” actions (*liang jian*) since the mid-2010s. Numerous social media accounts with liberal tendency were closed down; once prospering invetigative journalism withered away under increasing pressure; cameras in college classrooms have become the new normal; In a famous crackdown action in 2015, dozens of lawyers, who had been active in human rights area, were arrested.[[24]](#footnote-23) Therefore, higher education, as a proxy of ideologically risky occupations such as journalists, teachers/professors, media/socia media, publishers, movie/music/art industry etc., can be a roughly reasonable measurement of political fear no matter they work inside or outside the regime.

The third approach of robust check confines our datasets to one survey source. Despite our justification of combining different surveys, the doubt on comparing different surveys might remain. To address such doubt, in this robust check we conduct our regressions to the CSS. (本来是想run on CBS 1-5 with X=partyANDedu的，但是matched data不显著-可能与CBS3的treated groups N只有66个有关，所以换成了CSS). As mentioned earlier, the CSS has only one survey round asking the trust question before the treatment, making pre-treatment trend observation impossible. But the CSS has highly consistent surveys from 2017, 2019 and 2021. With the richest post-treatment data, it provides us very solid information on the post-treatment change, which happens to be where our main interest lies. This robust check, if consistent with our hypothesis, will enhance our confidence that our findings are not driven by the promiscuity of surveys.

**Results (这个部分毓淞你可以做任何major changes you see necessary)**

Before conducting regression analysis, it is necessary to establish the suitability of the Difference-in-Difference model in our study. According to…（请毓淞补充相关citation?）, the treated group and the control group need demonstrate a largely paralell trend to observe the effect of treatment so that the divergence observed, if any, cannot be attributed to pre-exsiting conditions.

As seem from Figure 3, such condition is largely met in our study: panel 1 descriptively displays the fluctuation of our main DV (trust\_dummy) for the two groups from raw data, and panel 2 on matched data. In both panels, political trust of the treated and the control group evolved in a largely paralell way before the treatment time. To be specific, trust of both groups experienced a relative decline, probably due to the “modernization” effect that socio-economic development produces “critical citizens” (Norris, 1999; Dalton and Welzel, 2014). The treated group, who tends to be more advanced in socioeconomic status, also demonstrates a higher level “criticalness.”

**Figure 3. Trend of political trust among the treated and control group.**

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The picture after the treatment time, however, is different. While both groups increased their level of political trust, they visibly diverged in degree of change, suggesting that common time trend cannot explain the whole story. If some have the concern that higher political trust of the treated group is a reflection of self-selection bias, that is, the more politically trusting people tend to become “regime insider,” the pre-treatment trends seem a rebuttal: before the treatment time, the treated group in fact on average had lower level political trust even after profile matching. Therefore, the divergence is more likely driven by peculiar dynamics after the treatment time.

We then proceed to analyzing whether the treatment and the observed divergence have a causal relationship through regressions. Our major quantity of interest is primarily the coefficient of the interaction between the treatment time (post-2015 years) and regime insiders since it is this interaction that generates fear in our DID design. Table 1 presents the results.

说明1：以下regression results数据集组合均为（除了column 6-9）：CBS2002+CSS2006+CGSS2010+CBS2014+CSS2017+CSS2019+CSS2021（可能有些放了CBS2019，已无从考据）. Column6-9刻意将分析对象局限于CBS or CSS，作为address survey inconsistency的robust checks。

说明2：我让朱萌试了一共15个models（包括robust checks），其中我们应该只需要保留一小半左右，但是我都列出来了（见下方，因为太宽，分成了两个tables），方便毓淞做减法（做减法比做加法容易）。每一个model的X、Y和model差异，表中都有说明。

我对控制收入有和你同样的疑虑，但是在我们的主模型中，似乎控制收入strengthen our story（不过没有它也不影响显著，而且好像在matched data上它的作用是负向的），所以保留了一些有控制收入的模型，供你取舍时参考。我个人倾向于不用。

说明3：取舍models的两种可能路径：1）放弃所有的matched data models，这样我们几乎所有的模型都显著，而且显著性很高； 2）保留matched data models，这样显著性会下降，而且少数model可能不显著（后来朱萌调整了一下，貌似trust\_R的matched data也显著了），这种情况下可能得选择性report robust check models.

下面我的诠释文字是选择了路径2（即保留并诠释matched results），不过毓淞你可能做出来结果有所不同（尤其是boorstrapping之后），所以请根据你的结果进行取舍。下方我的诠释文字都很简单，不涉及对具体数据的诠释，因为怕解释错，而且毓淞你可能选择不同的models，所以只是一个tentative的draft. 毓淞你写的时候可以make any revision you find necessary.

Model 1 runs logistic regression on raw data. As seen from the table, the interaction term significantly increases political trust, on top of the significant effects of “regime insiders” and “post treatment time” themselves as independent variables. Model 2 runs regression on matched data, still producing significant results although at a slightly lower level. Among control variables, age and rural *hukou* increase political trust, although the significance level drops to p <0.1 on matched data; higher level of education and being female, however, decrease political trust; marriage has inconclusive effect due to contradictory results.

The other models are robust checks of various forms, all on matched data to ensure rigor of the results. Model 3 and 4 are robust checks by using alternative DV formulas. Model 3 replaces the highest vs. the rest dummy with the positive vs. negative dummy. As seen from the table, the coefficient of the interaction term is still significant. Model 4 uses a continuous DV constructed by standardization, and the coefficient stays significant although only at p<0.1 level. Model 5 conducts another robust check through using an alternative IV. As explained earlier, “party membership plus higher education” can also detect political fear after the mid-2010s since higher education can be roughly taken as a proxy of ideologically risky occupations. The results in this model still points to the significance of the “fear factor,” when measured in an alternative way. Model 6 displays results from our last robust check by applying the regression only to the CSS surveys. Again, the significance of the interaction term stays, suggesting that our results are unlikely an “accident” caused by survey combination.

Table 1 (上半部分) 红色字体标出了我的文字诠释对象。Matching都是指nearest.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Column 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|  | Model 1 of LY |  | M2 of LY |  | M5 of LY |  |  |  | M6 of LY |
|  | X=partyANDwork  DID | X=pANDwok  DID + 收入控制 | X=paANDwork  DID+  mathcing | X=partyANDedu  DID | X=pANDedu  DID+ mathcing | X=pANDedu  DID  on CBS only | X=pANDedu  DID+ mathcing  on CBS only | X=pANDwork  DID  On CSS only | X=pANDwork  DID+matching  On CSS only |
|  | Columns 1-9中 都是Y=trust\_Max （二分） | | | | | | |  |  |
| (Intercept) | -0.285\*\*\* | -0.270\*\* | -0.236 | -0.827\*\*\* | -0.565\* | -0.258\*\*\* | -0.918\*\* | -1.164\*\*\* | -0.870\*\* |
| (0.059) | (0.084) | (0.431) | (0.037) | (0.240) | (0.062) | (0.320) | (0.060) | (0.278) |
| treat1 | 0.192\*\* | 0.205\*\* | 0.665\*\*\* | -0.366\*\*\* | -0.139 | -0.547\*\*\* | -0.257 | -0.038 | 0.179 |
| (0.067) | (0.079) | (0.124) | (0.060) | (0.123) | (0.117) | (0.184) | (0.143) | (0.207) |
| time | 0.226\*\*\* | 0.444\*\*\* | 1.287\*\*\* | 0.077\*\*\* | 1.035\*\*\* | -0.349\*\*\* | 0.158 | 0.025 | 0.173 |
| (0.019) | (0.026) | (0.161) | (0.018) | (0.236) | (0.038) | (0.481) | (0.032) | (0.171) |
| treat1 × time | 0.785\*\*\* | 1.085\*\*\* | 0.454\* | 1.009\*\*\* | 0.675\* | 0.820+ | 0.266 | 0.736\*\*\* | 0.536\* |
| (0.097) | (0.132) | (0.209) | (0.084) | (0.274) | (0.458) | (0.660) | (0.161) | (0.235) |
| age | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.020\*\*\* | 0.010\* | 0.025\*\*\* | 0.009+ | 0.015\*\*\* | 0.014\*\* | 0.037\*\*\* | 0.023\*\*\* |
| (0.0007) | (0.001) | (0.005) | (0.0006) | (0.005) | (0.001) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.005) |
| hukouRural | 0.282\*\*\* | 0.166\*\*\* | 0.174 | 0.363\*\*\* | 0.150 | 0.251\*\*\* | 0.098 | 0.241\*\*\* | 0.441\*\*\* |
| (0.022) | (0.029) | (0.152) | (0.019) | (0.185) | (0.036) | (0.256) | (0.028) | (0.124) |
| female | -0.270\*\*\* | -0.270\*\*\* | -0.363\*\*\* | -0.227\*\*\* | -0.367\*\* | -0.121\*\*\* | -0.149 | -0.384\*\*\* | -0.404\*\*\* |
| (0.019) | (0.025) | (0.105) | (0.017) | (0.112) | (0.032) | (0.188) | (0.026) | (0.104) |
| edu | -0.188\*\*\* | -0.140\*\*\* | -0.342\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| (0.012) | (0.017) | (0.078) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| marriage | -0.127\*\*\* | 0.041 | 0.438\*\* | -0.111\*\*\* | 0.243 | -0.361\*\*\* | 0.318 | -0.023 | 0.009 |
| (0.023) | (0.034) | (0.161) | (0.021) | (0.159) | (0.034) | (0.202) | (0.036) | (0.156) |
| incomeFaml |  | -0.047\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (0.008) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Num.Obs. | 52951 | 29808 | 2176 | 59424 | 1725 | 16350 | 548 | 28338 | 1907 |
| F |  |  | 36.709 |  | 25.299 |  | 2.312 |  | 15.710 |
| RMSE | 0.48 | 0.47 | 0.46 | 0.48 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.47 |
| + p < 0.1, \* p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001 | | | | | | | |  |  |

**Table 1 continued…**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Column 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 |
|  |  |  | M3 of LY  Robust check by replacing Y (R方案) |  |  | M4 of LY Robust check by replacing Y （z方案） |
|  | Column 10-15中都是X=partyANDwork | | | | | |
|  | Y=trust\_R  DID | Y=trust\_R  DID + 收入控制 | Y=trust\_R  DID+mathcing | Y=trust\_z  DID | Y=trust\_z  DID + 控制收入 | Y=trust\_z  DID+mathcing |
| (Intercept) | 1.688\*\*\* | 1.700\*\*\* | 4.774\*\*\* | 0.786\*\*\* | 0.788\*\*\* | 0.817\*\*\* |
|  | (0.137) | (0.210) | (1.211) | (0.005) | (0.008) | (0.035) |
| treat1 | 0.143 | 0.045 | 0.278 | 0.022\*\*\* | 0.022\*\* | 0.062\*\*\* |
|  | (0.181) | (0.224) | (0.303) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.011) |
| time | -0.799\*\*\* | -0.514\*\*\* | 0.538 | -0.016\*\*\* | 0.012\*\*\* | 0.071\*\*\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.066) | (0.437) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.014) |
| treat1 × time | 1.526\*\*\* | 3.381\*\* | 2.321\* | 0.066\*\*\* | 0.081\*\*\* | 0.029+ |
|  | (0.325) | (1.028) | (1.107) | (0.008) | (0.010) | (0.017) |
| age | 0.036\*\*\* | 0.032\*\*\* | -0.015 | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.002\*\*\* | 0.0007 |
|  | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.012) | (0.00006) | (0.00009) | (0.0004) |
| hukouRural | 0.384\*\*\* | 0.322\*\*\* | 0.405 | 0.028\*\*\* | 0.016\*\*\* | 0.018 |
|  | (0.051) | (0.074) | (0.559) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.012) |
| female | -0.226\*\*\* | -0.196\*\* | 0.047 | -0.022\*\*\* | -0.022\*\*\* | -0.027\*\* |
|  | (0.045) | (0.066) | (0.306) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.009) |
| edu | 0.078\*\* | 0.111\*\* | -0.374 | -0.012\*\*\* | -0.009\*\*\* | -0.020\*\* |
|  | (0.028) | (0.043) | (0.232) | (0.001) | (0.002) | (0.006) |
| marriage | -0.084 | 0.155+ | 0.405 | -0.008\*\*\* | 0.010\*\* | 0.018 |
|  | (0.056) | (0.084) | (0.422) | (0.002) | (0.003) | (0.013) |
| incomeFaml |  | -0.010 |  |  | -0.004\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.021) |  |  | (0.0007) |  |
| Num.Obs. | 56155 | 29808 | 2176 | 59818 | 29808 | 1969 |
| R2 |  |  |  | 0.045 | 0.043 | 0.108 |
| R2 Adj. |  |  |  | 0.045 | 0.042 | 0.104 |
| AIC |  |  |  | -28871.6 | -14520.3 | -1212.4 |
| BIC |  |  |  | -28781.6 | -14429.0 | -1156.5 |
| Log.Lik. |  |  |  | 14445.815 | 7271.155 | 616.179 |
| F |  |  | 1.883 |  |  | 29.569 |
| RMSE | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.18 |

Boorstrapping here?

While both the main model and robust checks lend support to our hypotheses, an alternative explanation for the fear-trust dynamics seems legitimate: faking.[[25]](#footnote-24) It can be said that “the more fearful group faked more in surveys.” We resort to two widely used tests to see if it is the case.

First is to compare the nonresponse rate of treated group and that of the control gorup on the trust question, examining if the former has increased more compared to the later. Nonresponse rate is widely used as a test of self-censorship (Shi, 2008; Munro, 2018; Shen and Truex, 2021). The assumption of this test is that if fear leads to opinion falsification, some will choose to “hide” in fake answers, and some will presumably choose to “hide” in nonresponses. If nonresponse rate of the treated group shows no deviance from that of the control group, it is reasonable to infer that “fake answers” are not pervasive either.

The second test focuses on the treated group, but compares their nonresponse rate on sensitive question to that on less sensitive question. The assumptioin of this test is that, if political fear of the treated group leads to faking, it is supposed to lead to more faking on more sensitive question. If the two changes in a parallel way or even opposite way, it is likely that the rising trust is a reflection of genuine attitude change. Here we take “trust in the central government” as the sensitive question and “trust in courts” as the less sensitive question, and compare their nonresponse rates.[[26]](#footnote-25)

Admittedly, cross-survey comparison on nonresponse rate can be problematic since different surveys offer different nonresponse categories, which might affect respondents’ choices.[[27]](#footnote-26) However, all post-treatment observations in our study are from the CSS (2017, 2019, 2021), and all CSS surveys (including the 2006 one) are highly consistent on political trust questions, thus making post-2015 longitudinal comparison, the focus of our interests, very reliable.

Figure 4 visually displays results of the two tests, in which nonresponse refers to various forms of question evasion, such as “Do not know,” “Do not understand,” “Hard to say,” or outright refusal to answer the question. Panel 1 is the result of the first test. As seen from the panel, nonresponse rate of the treated group has been consistently lower across all surveys, against the faking hypothesis. In addition, it has declined along with the nonresponse rate of the control group since the treatment time, whereas the faking hypothesis would predict their rise. More importantly, the degree of its decline is paralell to that of the control group, suggesting that, even if the treated group were faking, they were not faking more, thus “faking” cannot explain the post-treatment divergence of politica trust. Panel 2 conveys similar message. No matter measured by cross sectional comparison in a particular year or longitudinal trends, the sensitive question does not generate more nonresponse rate. If anything, Figure 4 shows that the treated group is in fact “faking” less.

Figure 4. Two tests of self-censorship based on nonresponse rates

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |

**Conclusion**

等主要结论确定后，我再根据results来写。下面只是一些additional remarks.

By acknowledging that political fear and trust can coexist and even reinforce one another, we can better understand the complex dynamics at play in the formation of political trust in China. It is essential to continue exploring the various factors that contribute to these contrasting findings and to develop a more nuanced understanding of political trust and wariness in the Chinese context. By doing so, we can develop a more comprehensive picture of the underlying mechanisms driving public opinion in authoritarian regimes, which could ultimately have significant implications for both domestic and international politics.

It should be noted that while our primary focus is on the changing level of political trust among "regime insiders" in the context of the anti-corruption campaign, the fear-love dynamics are not limited to this group in contemporary China. Political fear may be uneven among social groups and fluctuate at different times, but it is pervasive in an increasingly authoritarian regime. "Regime insiders" may fear the consequences of the anti-corruption campaign, but private businessmen worry about arbitrary policy changes; journalists fear making incorrect reports; lawyers worry about taking on the wrong cases; and social media bloggers fear losing their accounts for publishing one controversial article. We focus on "regime insiders" because their fear after the launch of the anti-corruption campaign is prominent and measurable, making our study more operationalizable.

This pervasive fear inevitably leads to more compliant behaviors through a tilting incentive structure. A director may be more inclined to make "patriotic" movies since creating a "wrong" movie could mean rejection by the censorship apparatus and the loss of millions in investors' money. A college student may be more likely to apply for Party membership because not doing so might limit their job prospects. A businessman might be more incentivized to invest in government-sponsored sectors due to the flow of subsidies. A social media blogger may be more likely to withhold their comments on the darker aspects of society for fear of being banned for political criticism.

According to the induced compliance paradigm of the cognitive dissonance theory, which we employ in this study, such behavioral compliance can lead to a genuine rise in regime endorsement through a process of self-persuasion. The high cost of non-compliant behaviors is a given in an increasingly tense atmosphere, but at the same time, no one forces a director to make a patriotic movie, a student to join the CCP, a businessman to invest in a government-sponsored sector, or a blogger to withdraw a post. Yet the surrounding incentive structure makes such choices "rational." Ultimately, human beings are programmed by evolution to be rational. However, it is precisely the "free choice" they exercise in fear that propels them into a psychological journey of transforming fear into love.

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以下是补充的，请加到之前整理过的bib里，然后放进来。。

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此外，文中有一些footnote实际上是新闻报道链接，请观察一下目标杂志是怎么处理这个问题的，然后依葫芦画瓢

**Online Appendix A: On the coding rules for the “regime insiders.”**

In this study, we identify the treated group, “regime insiders,” through the combination of CCP membership and job in state sector. The identification of the CCP membership is straightforward, requiring little explanation. The identification of state-sector jobs, however, is much less clear due to inconsistencies of surveys and vagueness of question wording. As explained in the paper, some surveys have the question on job nature, and some not. Even different rounds of the same survey can suffer such problems. This is why we had to combine different surveys to identify “regime insiders.”

To minimize the risk of comparing apples and oranges across different surveys, we enforce a unified rule in coding state vs. non-state sector across different surveys. The information we rely on to make the distinction is three-fold: the status of employment, nature of workunit and occupation codes. We adopt the following procedures to conduct the coding.

First, based on status of employment, we code all respondents unemployed, retired, laid off, peasants and housewives as 0 (non-state sector), retaining only those employed for further screening. The only exception are “students.” Although students are not officially employed, we still directly label them as 1 (state sector) because there is almost no private colleges and very few private high schools in China (the “students” in surveys are presumably college students or senior high-school students since all survey respondents are above 18). Although students do not depend on the state for salaries, they do depend on the state-owned schools for receiving diploma, financial aid, academic honors, job recommendation and in a sense, a bright future. We therefore label students as in state sector.

Second, based on occupation codes that provide information on whether the respondent is a physical laborer, we code all physical laborers as 0 no matter which type of workunit he/she reports. This is because of the theoretical question we intend to study: we want to detect the effect of political fear. As explained in the paper, there is no theoretical or empirical reason to believe pure physical laborers, such as cleaners working in government buildings, construction workers employed by state owned construction companies, or security guards for universities, are threatened either by any dimension of the anti-corruption campaign. So we only keep white-collar employees for further screening.

Third, among the white collar employees that remain, we use the “nature of workunit” question to identify state-sector employees. With only minor differences in question wording across surveys (see Appendix B), the answers to the question tend to have a very similar range. Taking the ABS 5 (2019) as an example, the question is phrased as “what is nature of your workunit or previous workunit before retirement?” A total of 13 categories are offered in the answer: 1) the CCP and government; 2) state-owned enterprises; 3) state-dominant joint venture or shareholding enterprises; 4) foreign capital dominant enterprises; 5) foreign owned enterprises; 6) government affiliated institutions (in Chinese, *shiye danwei*); 7) government affiliated institutions owned by joint venture of shareholding; 8) self-employed businessmen; 9) collective enterprises (including township owned enterprises); 10) private enterprises; 11) others; 98) do not know; 99) no answer. We group all CCP/government organizations, state owned/dominant or collective enterprises, and state-affiliated institutions (cateogory 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9 ) as tate sector, and the rest (category 4, 5, 8, 10, 11) as non state sector, leaving category 98 and 99 as they are. After these three steps, we reach a dummy variable that distinguishes state sector from non state sector. When a respondent is both a CCP member and a state sector employee, we code them as a “regime insider.”

**Online Appendix B: On the comparability of two key variables across different surveys.**

Due to frequent adjustment of questionnaires in different survey rounds, none of the major opinion surveys in contemporary China we are aware of consistently asks the same key questions we rely on to construct our IV and DV. We are therefore forced to combine three surveys to make longitudinal analyses possible. To be specific, we assemble the following surveys together in order to have reasonable intervals both before and after the treatment time: China Barometer Survey (CBS) 2002, Chinese Social Survey (CSS) 2006, Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2010, CBS 2014, CSS 2017, CBS 2019 as well as CSS 2019, CSS 2021. Fortunately, two key questions we rely on, one on “nature of workunit” through which we identify our treated group (regime insiders), and the other on “trust in the central government” based on which we construct our DV, are framed in a highly similar way, thus making our approach justifiable.

Table 1 lists the questions on “nature of workunit” and their answers from all surveys we use. As seen from the table, both the questions and the answers are presented in a highly similar way. Although the concrete wording and the number/order of the answers can be slightly different, we minimize such differences by applying a unified rule in grouping answers, as explained in Appendix A. Considering that the variable is a dummy, thus the measurement being quite coarse, we believe the identification of “regime insiders” is consistent across all surveys.

Table 2 lists the questions on “trust in the central government” and their answers. Again, as seen from the table, both the questions and the answers are highly similar. Admittedly, some surveys offer 6 ordinal cateogories to choose from (CBS), some 5 (CGSS) and some 4 (CSS), which might affect the respondents’ choices. This is why one of our robust check confines the analyses to only one survey source, with an adjusted IV as explained in the paper. The results from this exercise is highly consistent with those from the combined surveys, thus increasing our confidence in the survey combination approach.

**Table 1. Wording of the “nature of workunit” questions and answers in different surveys.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Survey | Question | Answers |
| CBS2002 | 101. What kind of workunit do you work in? | 0. Party and government organs  1. State affiliated institutions  2. State-owned enterprises  3. Collective enterprises  4. Private companies  5.Three types foreign-funded enterprises  6. Self-employed business  8. Others (please specify)  7. [Do not read] Not applicable  9. [Don’t read] Don’t answer |
| CBS2014 | SE3. What is the nature of your current/pre-retirement workunit? | 1. Party and government organs  2. State-owned enterprises  3. State-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises  4. Foreign-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises  5. Foreign-owned enterprises  6. State-affiliated institutions  7. State-affiliated joint venture or joint-stock institutions  8. Self employed business  9. Collective enterprises (including township enterprises)  10. Private companies  11. Other [specify]  98. [Don't read] I don't know  99. [Do not read] Do not answer |
| CBS2019 | SE5. What is the nature of your current/pre-retirement workunit? | 1. Party and government organs  2. State-owned enterprises  3. State-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises  4. Foreign-controlled joint venture, cooperative or joint-stock enterprises  5. Foreign-owned enterprises  6. State-affiliated institutions  7. State-affiliated joint venture or joint-stock institutions  8. Self employed business  9. Collective enterprises (including township enterprises)  10. Private companies  11. Other [specify]  98. [Don't read] I don't know  99. [Do not read] Do not answer |
| CGSS2010 | A59j. The type of workunit or company you are currently working for is: | 1. Party and government organs  2. Enterprises  3. State-affiliated enterprises  4. Social organizations  5. No workunit/self-employed/self-managing (joint venture)  6. Military  7. Others（specify） |
| A59k. The nature of ownership of the workunit or company you are currently working for is: | 1. State-owned or state-controlled  2. Collective owned or collective-controlled  3. Private owned /private managed /private-controlled  4. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan funded or controlled  5. Foreign-owned or foreign-controlled  6. Others (please specify) |
| CSS2006 | B4a. The type of workunit/company you work for is: | 1. Party and government organs  2. State-owned enterprises  3. State-affiliated institutions  4. Collective enterprises/institutions  5. Non-state (private) enterprises/institutions  6.Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions  7. Self-managing business  8. Rural family business  9. Rural collective economy  10. Social groups and community self-governing organizations  11. Others (please specify)  12. No workunit  13. Not sure |
| CSS2017 | B4a. The worunit/company where you do this non-agricultural job is: | 1. Party and government organs, people's organizations, and the military  2. State-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises  3. State-affiliated/collective institutions  4. Collective enterprises  5. Private companies  6.Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions  7. Self-employed business  8. Collective-owned institutions (collective non-enterprise workunits)  9. Self-governing organizations such as village committees and neighborhood committees.  10. Others (Specify)  11. No workunit  98. Not Sure |
| CSS2019 | B4a. The worunit/company where you do this non-agricultural job is: | 1. Party and government organs, people's organizations, and the military  2. State-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises  3. State-affiliated/collective institutions  4. Collective enterprises  5. Private companies  6.Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions  7. Self-employed business  8. Collective-owned institutions (collective non-enterprise workunits)  9. Self-governing organizations such as village committees and neighborhood committees  10. Social groups and self-governing organizations  11. Others (please specify)  12. No workunit  98. Not sure |
| CSS2021 | B5a:The worunit/company where you do this non-agricultural job is: | 1. Party and government organs, people's organizations, and the military  2. State-owned enterprises and state-controlled enterprises  3. State-affiliated/collective institutions  4. Collective enterprises  5. Private companies  6.Three types foreign-funded enterprises/institutions  7. Self-employed business  8. Collective-owned institutions (collective non-enterprise workunits)  9. Self-governing organizations such as village committees and neighborhood committees  10. Social groups and self-governing organizations  11. Others (please specify)  12. No workunit  -1. Not sure |

**Table 2. Wording of the “trust in the central government” question and answers in different surveys.**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Survey | Question | Answers |
| CBS2002 | 73. If we use 1 to represent complete distrust, and 6 to represent complete trust, how do you trust the central government? | 1、Completely distrust  2、Fairly distrust  3、Somewhat distrust  4、Somewhat trust  5、Fairly trust  6、Completely trust  0、Hard to say  8、Do not know  9、No response |
| CBS2014 | E1.How much do you trust the central government? | 1、Completely distrust  2、Fairly distrust  3、Somewhat distrust  4、Somewhat trust  5、Fairly trust  6、Completely trust  7、Do not understand  8、Do not know  9、No response |
| CBS2019 | E4. How much do you trust the central government? | 1、Completely distrust  2、Fairly distrust  3、Somewhat distrust  4、Somewhat trust  5、Fairly trust  6、Completely trust  7、Do not understand  8、Do not know  9、No response |
| CGSS2010 | D3. How much do you trust the central government? | 1、Completely distrust  2、Fairly distrust  3、Between trust and distrust  4、Fairly trust  5、Completely trust |
| CSS2006 | E5. In general, how much do you trust the central government? | 1、Distrust very much  2、Fairly distrust  3、Fairly trust  4、Trust very much  5、Not sure. |
| CSS2017 | F1a2: Could you please tell us: do you trust the central government? (choose one) | 1. Complete distrust  2. Fairly distrust  3. Fairly trust  4. Trust very much  8. Hard to say |
| CSS2019 | F1a. Could you please tell us: do you trust the central government? (choose one) | 1. Complete distrust  2. Fairly distrust  3. Fairly trust  4. Trust very much  8. Hard to say |
| CSS2021 | F1a. Could you please tell us: do you trust the central government? (choose one) | 1. Complete distrust  2. Fairly distrust  3. Fairly trust  4. Trust very much  -1. Hard to say |

Online Appendix C.

朱萌，请在此解释Figure 1 中所有数据的信息来源，用列表的方式亦可，加一小段文字说明（英文）

The following news reports summarise the results of China's anti-corruption campaign from 2006 to 2022, including the number of cases filed and the number of people disciplined by the Party each year.These authoritative or official reports help us understand the anti-corruption campaign in China before and after Xi come to power.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Report time | Headlines | Source |
| Apr 1,  2006 | Deepening the Party's integrity and anti-corruption struggle | <http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-04/01/content_242262.htm> |
| February 14, 2007 | Expanding the work field to prevent and control corruption from the source | <http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/200702/14/t20070214_10431426.shtml> |
| February 23, 2009 | Focusing on the improving system of punishment and prevention of corruption | <http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2009-02-23/0716543101.html> |
| February 21, 2011 | Striving to achieve new results in the construction of the Party's integrity and the fight against corruption | <https://sthjt.qinghai.gov.cn/hjgl/qmcyzd/zhxx/201102/t20110221_64234.html> |
| January 9, 2013 | The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) informs investigated cases in 2012 | <https://news.12371.cn/2013/01/09/ARTI1357705901155210.shtml> |
| January 10, 2014 | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) informs the construction of the Party's integrity and anti-corruption efforts in 2013 | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/schy/ttgz_schy/201401/t20140113_16913.html> |
| January 29, 2015 | Report on the Work of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/special/wcqh/tt/201501/t20150130_50819.html> |
| January 25, 2016 | Report on the Work of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection | <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0125/c64094-28080355.html> |
| January 6, 2017 | Report on the Work of the Seventh Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection | <https://zgjjjc.ccdi.gov.cn/bqml/bqxx/201701/t20170121_93114.html> |
| January 11, 2018 | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2017 | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiao/201801/t20180110_161529.html> |
| January 9, 2019 | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2018 | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiaon/201901/t20190108_94551.html> |
| January 18, 2020 | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2019 | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiaon/201901/t20190108_94551.html> |
| January 26, 2021 | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2020 | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowenn/202101/t20210126_84660.html> |
| January 21, 2022 | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2021 | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutiaon/202201/t20220121_166060.html> |
| January 13, 2023 | Central Commission for Discipline Inspection informs national supervision and investigation cases in 2022 | <https://www.ccdi.gov.cn/toutun/202301/t20230113_241621.html> |

1. What’s particularly intriguing about this experiment is that people offered less money experienced even larger attitude change, probably because cognitive dissonance aroused in the low-reward condition is even larger. [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
2. Given the two interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, we still stick to the general label “cognitive dissonance theory” to avoid straying too much into social psychology debates. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
3. In China, some key sectors such as railroad, airlines, finance and oil are largely monopolized by the state. Legally speaking , all land are state or collective owned. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
4. <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/chinas-support-private-sector-only-lip-service-so-far> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
5. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
6. Presumably, those active participants could have been firmer believers from the beginning, but active participation itself could strengthen their beliefs further. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
7. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-06/30/c_1127611673.htm> 里面还有一些demographic 数据 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
8. This number excludes the military and state-owned enterprises. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
9. # 国考公务员人数历年情况分析 <https://m.gwy.com/gjgwy/232188.html>

   [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
10. <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1737006631362329621&wfr=spider&for=pc> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
11. 报道。。 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
12. <https://www.ft.com/content/ae4d37bd-0440-491b-a4b7-25ab6158e6ad> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
13. In the annual reports issued by the CCDI, the case number of invesigations has been on par with that of punishments. For example, in 2020, the investigation number is 618,000, and the punishment number is 604,000. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
14. The numbers were reported by Pei Xiao, deputy Party secretary of the Central Commission of Discipline Inspection during the 20th Party Congress. See: 《中国经济周刊》22.10.17 现场报道.

    <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1746930636390613166&wfr=spider&for=pc> [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
15. 举例。。。 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
16. Exact sources of the numbers in Figure 1 can be found in Appendix C. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
17. Frequently, more efforts are in exchange for with lower material rewards given more anti corruption rules are installed. As stated by the basic framework of the induced compliance paradigm, cognitive dissonance arises in a low-reward, high-effort condition, resulting in a greater magnitude of attitude change. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
18. 解释，江、胡时代也有。。。 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
19. 1+1才是1，都是0则为0，只有一个1,为NA [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
20. 解释workunit… [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
21. It is important to note that different surveys, or even different rounds of the same survey, may frame questions and their answers in slightly varying ways. Here we use the questionnaire of the ABS (wave 5) as an example. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
22. The surveys record respondents’ concrete occupations through a system of occupation codes, through which we are able to determine whether this respondent is a physical labor or not. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
23. For example, for the year of 2002, only 41 respondents chose negative answers (vs. 2964 positive answers); 2006 and 2014 also have less than 200 cases (vs. more 6600 and 3500 positive answers respectively). Considering that the matching exercises and missing values in control variables could further reduce case number, the reliability of regression results can be jeopardized. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
24. 709律师。。。 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
25. 其实未必矛盾 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
26. Due to short supply of consistent questions across all surveys, we have a very limited choices of questions for comparison. Even “trust in local governments” are often phrased in incomparable ways, with some asking about “trust in local governments,” but some about “trust in county/district government” or “trust in township-level government.” 并解释court less sensitive… [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
27. For example… [↑](#footnote-ref-26)